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Evaluating Peacekeeping Missions in Ukraine: Historical Lessons and Challenges
As Europe contemplates deploying peacekeeping forces to Ukraine amidst ongoing geopolitical tensions, historical peacekeeping missions offer crucial lessons, highlighting that such endeavors are not guaranteed to succeed. Indeed, peacekeepers have often struggled to prevent conflicts and have even become targets themselves in volatile regions. The deployment of European peacekeepers in Ukraine necessitates a careful examination of past operations and the inherent limitations and risks associated with peacekeeping interventions.
The Nature of Peacekeeping Forces
Peacekeeping is most commonly associated with the United Nations, which pioneered the concept by sending military observers to the Middle East in 1948 to oversee the armistice following the 1948 Arab-Israeli War. Currently, the UN maintains approximately 72,000 peacekeepers across 11 global conflict zones. Notably, Russian peacekeepers have previously collaborated with NATO forces in Bosnia. However, their efforts to serve as a buffer between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the contested Nagorno-Karabakh region proved ultimately unsuccessful.
Regional organizations like the African Union have also engaged in peacekeeping, deploying troops from South Africa and other African nations in various regional conflicts. For some countries, such as Bangladesh and Pakistan, participation in UN peacekeeping operations, offering comparatively remunerative compensation for their soldiers, has become a source of national income.
Defining a European Peacekeeping Role in Ukraine
The notion of employing European troops to uphold a fragile peace between Ukraine and Russia immediately encounters a fundamental conceptual ambiguity. Would their mandate be to simply maintain peace, or also to actively protect Ukraine? Traditional peacekeeping doctrine emphasizes neutrality and a primarily monitoring role. In fact, the UN outlines four core principles for peacekeeping operations: impartiality, consent of the warring parties, and the non-use of force except in self-defense.
Concerns of Bias and Operational Challenges
Accusations of partiality directed at peacekeepers are not uncommon. For instance, Israel has long alleged that the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) overlooks Hezbollah activities along the Israel-Lebanon border, which preceded Israeli military incursions into Lebanon in October. A European peacekeeping mission in Ukraine would face similar challenges related to perceived bias.
Despite proposals suggesting a European, rather than NATO, framework for a peacekeeping force in Ukraine, participating troops would originate from NATO member states or NATO-aligned countries. It is highly probable that Russia would interpret such a deployment as a permanent Western expeditionary force designed to protect Ukraine against potential future Russian actions.
Two Models of Peacekeeping Operations
Fundamentally, peacekeeping operations can be categorized into two models. The first model focuses on acting as an armed conflict observer, tasked with documenting violations of agreements by any party. The second model involves deploying a force of sufficient size and with a mandate to actively defend a party under attack, akin to the US-led United Nations Command established to defend South Korea, an operation that has persisted for over seven decades.
The Danger to Peacekeepers
Regardless of the operational model, a significant risk exists: what course of action is taken when peacekeepers themselves become targets, whether inadvertently caught in crossfire or intentionally attacked?
Regrettably, over 4,423 UN peacekeepers have perished as of February 2025, with 1,134 deaths attributed to “malicious acts.” In Lebanon, UN personnel have been caught in fire from both Israeli and Hezbollah forces. In January 2025, several UN peacekeepers were killed while combating M23 rebels in eastern Congo.
Limitations of Peacekeeping Firepower
Peacekeeping forces generally possess greater symbolic influence than actual combat power. The readily identifiable white armored vehicles utilized by UN contingents might suffice to deter unarmed civilians engaged in riots or looting, or possibly insurgents equipped with light weapons and improvised explosive devices. However, in Congo, UN forces are encountering difficulties in confronting rebels armed with anti-tank missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles.
Any peacekeeping force deployed in Ukraine would find itself positioned between two nations heavily armed with artillery, tanks, missiles, and drones. Potentially, fully equipped European mechanized brigades, supported by air assets, could possess the necessary firepower to discourage attacks. Indeed, Ukrainian officials have indicated that a European peacekeeping mission would only be meaningful if the peacekeepers were prepared to engage in combat if necessary.
The Risk of Escalation
Conversely, Russia’s invasion was motivated by a desire to dominate Ukraine and prevent its alignment with the EU and NATO. A substantial deployment of British and French troops near the Russian border could be perceived by the Kremlin as a deliberate provocation.
Russia could undermine peacekeeping operations without resorting to conventional heavy weaponry. Numerous methods exist to harass peacekeepers, ranging from IEDs planted by clandestine pro-Russian elements, to artillery fire that “accidentally” strikes a barracks. While such actions would carry the risk of escalating tensions with Europe and potentially NATO, Moscow might calculate that even a limited number of casualties could prompt European public opinion to demand troop withdrawal.
Effectiveness of Peacekeeping: A Mixed Record
Ultimately, the success of peacekeeping is judged by its ability to maintain peace, or at least reduce the level of violence. The historical record in this regard is inconsistent. Israelis vividly recall the 1967 withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) – stationed in the Sinai Peninsula to buffer Israel and Egypt – following Egyptian demands. This abrupt departure directly preceded Israel’s preemptive attack against Egypt in the Six-Day War. Similarly, UNIFIL forces have been stationed along the Israel-Lebanon border since 1978, yet this presence has not prevented major conflicts in 1982, 2006, and 2024, along with numerous border skirmishes.
Nevertheless, the UN asserts the effectiveness of peacekeeping, citing successful missions in locations such as Cambodia and Namibia. Furthermore, stationing troops in allied nations has also demonstrably contributed to maintaining peace. For example, the presence of US forces in South Korea likely deterred North Korea from launching an invasion, while US deployments in Germany during the Cold War served as a deterrent against a potential Soviet invasion of Western Europe.
Conclusion: Uncertain Prospects for Ukraine
Peacekeeping operations appear most likely to achieve their objectives when peacekeepers possess overwhelming military capability, or when the belligerent parties themselves reach a genuine decision to cease hostilities. A prospective European peacekeeping force in Ukraine might realistically find itself lacking both of these crucial conditions.