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Shifting Neutrality: China’s Response to the DR Congo Conflict
China’s expanding business interests across Africa have traditionally been supported by a policy of neutrality. However, the ongoing conflict in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DR Congo) appears to be prompting a change in Beijing’s approach. Accusations against Rwanda for fueling the conflict in the mineral-rich region have drawn Beijing into the fray, despite its close ties to both DR Congo and Rwanda. China is now navigating a delicate diplomatic path, seeking to maintain positive relations with both nations while protecting its economic operations and access to vital resources.
China’s Evolving Stance on African Conflicts
For decades, China has carefully avoided taking sides in African conflicts, primarily to safeguard its extensive commercial interests on the continent. Historically, Beijing has refrained from publicly criticizing African governments, even those implicated in supporting conflict participants. For instance, China maintained a low profile regarding the series of coups in West Africa’s Sahel region since 2020, only issuing general appeals for leaders to prioritize the welfare of their people.
Professor Zhou Yuyuan, an expert in African development and security at the Shanghai Institutes for International Studies (SIIS), explains that China’s longstanding policy of non-interference in internal affairs has led it to avoid proposing direct solutions to conflicts. Instead, Beijing typically advocates for diplomatic and political resolutions through international bodies like the UN or the African Union.
The resurgence of unrest in eastern DR Congo, involving Rwandan-backed M23 rebels, began in 2021. The M23, comprised mainly of ethnic Tutsis, claims to be defending minority rights due to the Congolese government’s alleged failure to honour a previous peace agreement. Initially, China’s comments on the situation cautiously criticized unspecified “foreign forces” for backing the M23.
Recently, however, China has deviated from its established pattern by explicitly naming Rwanda in its statements. This shift follows significant territorial gains by the M23, which captured key cities like Goma and Bukavu starting in January.
“China reiterates its hope that Rwanda will… stop its military support for M23 and immediately withdraw all its military forces from the DRC territory,” China’s UN ambassador declared in February.
Professor Zhou observes that while noteworthy, this “wording in general is still relatively mild.” He points out that “China ‘hoped’ that Rwanda would stop its support but did not condemn it.” Yet, soon after, China supported a UN Security Council resolution that directly demanded the Rwanda Defence Forces “cease support to the M23 and immediately withdraw from DRC territory without preconditions.”
Motivations Behind China’s Policy Adjustment
Professor Zhou suggests that UN expert reports, presenting compelling evidence of Rwanda’s backing of the M23, likely prompted China’s more assertive stance. He notes, “This is a basic consensus in the UN Security Council… The problem has been going on long enough, and everyone knows in their hearts the basic situation. There’s no need to be hush-hush any more.”
Neither China’s UN mission nor its London embassy offered immediate responses to requests for clarification on the reasons behind China’s criticism of Rwanda. However, the crucial importance of DR Congo’s considerable mineral resources to China could be a significant factor.
The fighting in eastern DR Congo is concentrated in North and South Kivu provinces, regions with a high concentration of Chinese-operated gold mines. The precise impact of the conflict on these mines remains uncertain. Moreover, the M23 has seized control of areas containing coltan mines, a key ore extensively imported by China.
Coltan ore is the source of tantalum, a metal vital for producing capacitors used in cars and everyday electronics including televisions and smartphones. DR Congo accounts for 40% of the world’s coltan supply.
A UN expert panel reported in December 2024 that the M23 had been smuggling coltan from DR Congo into Rwanda. They also noted a 50% increase in Rwanda’s coltan exports between 2022 and 2023. Analysts suggest that Rwanda’s own coltan mining capacity is unlikely to explain such a substantial export surge.
It is not yet established whether the conflict has affected the volume or price of coltan imported by China. Cobalt, another essential mineral for the lithium battery industry and a key import from DR Congo for China, is primarily mined in southern DR Congo, outside the immediate conflict zones.
Numerous Chinese firms, many state-owned, are involved in infrastructure development in DR Congo, including road construction, telecommunications, and hydropower projects. The impact of the current conflict on these broader activities appears to be limited thus far.
China’s Military Ties with DR Congo and Rwanda
China supplies arms to both Rwanda and DR Congo. Over the past two decades, Rwanda’s military has acquired Chinese armoured vehicles, artillery, and anti-tank missiles, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (Sipri). In 2024, China appointed its first military attaché to Rwanda.
While UN experts indicate that the Rwandan military has armed the M23, it is still unconfirmed whether the rebel group is utilizing Chinese weaponry. The Congolese armed forces also possess Chinese military equipment, including armoured personnel carriers and drones. Chinese tanks, purchased in 1976, were reportedly still in operation as recently as 2022. There are reports suggesting that drones, at least, have been deployed in the fight against the M23.
Impact on China-Rwanda and China-DR Congo Relations
The Rwandan embassy in Beijing stated that relations with China remain “excellent and productive.” It deferred comment on China’s statement regarding the eastern DR Congo conflict, noting it was not Rwanda’s place to comment. China’s ambassador to DR Congo, Zhao Bin, met with Congolese Senate President Sama Lukonde in early February, though the specifics of their discussion were not disclosed.
China’s economic involvement in both countries is substantial. Both DR Congo and Rwanda are participants in China’s Belt and Road Initiative, a global infrastructure and investment program aimed at strengthening China’s global connections. China has financed stadiums, schools, and highways in Rwanda. Chinese loans also support various infrastructure projects, including a $40 million loan, confirmed in January, for a dam and irrigation system.
China has been the primary source of imports for Rwanda for several years. Similarly, the UN Comtrade Database shows that China has consistently been DR Congo’s leading trading partner. China has made considerable efforts to secure access to DR Congo’s valuable mineral resources, extending $3.2 billion in loans between 2005 and 2022, as per Boston University’s Chinese Loans to Africa Database. These loans primarily funded road and bridge construction and improvements to the country’s electricity grid.
China has financed and constructed other major infrastructure projects in DR Congo, including hydropower stations and a dry port. These extensive investments may suggest that resolving the conflict swiftly is in China’s long-term strategic and economic interests.