A win against Isis can’t mask fundamental problems in the US response to terrorism

<span>Photograph: UPI/Barcroft Media</span>
Photograph: UPI/Barcroft Media

Taking out one of the leaders of the Islamic State is a symbolic and tangible achievement in blunting Isis’s influence. The work of the US military, intelligence agencies and partners on the ground made this possible. And as much as Trump wants to claim personal credit, the success of the raid only highlighted the dangers of his haphazard withdrawal of US troops from Syria: the New York Times reports that the success of the raid occurred “in spite of” Trump’s recent Syria moves, as the Kurds were the key partners providing intelligence and the US military was concerned they wouldn’t get another shot at Baghdadi because intelligence would be significantly reduced after the US withdrawal.

But the circumstances surrounding the raid and its announcement raise broader concerns about the nature of America’s counterterrorism policies.

Trump’s announcement itself was disturbing – even setting aside the completely inappropriate description of the death, the unnecessary divulsion of details about the raid and Trump’s self-congratulatory comments making the event about himself. The very fact that we treat the killing of a single terrorist like a national event reveals how our national security priorities are sometimes out of order. Obama’s announcement of the raid that killed Osama bin Laden seemed appropriate, as it felt in part like closure after 3,000 Americans were killed on 9/11 (and Obama’s solemn remarks marked it with the right tone). But presidents hardly ever address the nation when a climate deal is reached or a peacekeeping mission helps deter violence. This may be because presidents feel the need to garner public support for the use of the military abroad, but it’s just as easily chalked up to the overly militaristic approach the US has adopted to counter-terrorism, and how deeply leaders feel the need to look tough in the face of terrorism.

The announcement also reinforced how the fear factor of terrorism can dominate US national security policy and how irresponsible politicians like Trump use that fear to pursue dangerous policies. The rise of Isis – the gruesome videos of murder, attacks abroad, and the fact that Isis controlled territory – was deadly serious. While pursuing a military campaign along with allies, Obama was criticized for trying to keep the threat in perspective for Americans. During the 2016 campaign and since Trump on the other hand has played on the public’s fear, linking Isis to immigration to scare people. And the public’s fear of terrorism, despite the chances of being hurt by terrorism are virtually none, keeps counter-terrorism efforts at a much more prominent place in national discourse and policy making than they should be.

The raid was possible because of a US military presence in the area, but the global war on terror has driven the US to have a significantly expanded global military presence for counter-terrorism purposes – a trend that should concern Americans. While the US has improved its intelligence and other capabilities to detect and prevent terrorism since 9/11, it has often used the military as a tool of first resort, from Afghanistan to Iraq and beyond. The US military is sometimes the only option for going after terrorists, but we are not nearly cautious enough about its use. Not only does this approach militarize US relationships with countries, but it also means that the military tools end up with outsized influence in determining US policies. It doesn’t have to be that way: A new Cap study shows that Americans want leaders to focus on terrorism, but don’t want to treat it like a military problem.

Moreover, almost every time we announce a military operation today it is a stark reminder that Congress likely has not voted to use force in those countries. Congress has never explicitly voted to authorize military operations in Yemen or against Isis in Iraq or Syria. While Congress has appropriated funds to fight certain conflicts – and thereby could be construed as approving them – the 2001 AUMF is being stretched to justify CT efforts almost 20 years later. No wonder the US military’s global footprint looks the way it does – with Congress unwilling to vote on military conflicts, there’s little standing in the way of a president who wants to expand that presence.

The news about Baghdadi came in the midst of an increasingly rare bipartisan moment, with members of both parties criticizing Trump’s decision to withdraw US troops from Syria in a disastrous fashion. The criticism is justified; the way in which Trump withdrew the troops has been catastrophic, resulting in freed Isis terrorists, abandoning the Kurds to a grim fate, helping Russia, Iran and Syria. But the very fact that America’s political parties – at loggerheads on just about everything – can agree that removing troops from a foreign conflict (no matter how badly it was done) is worthy of condemnation is a deeply worrying sign about the politics of national security. One can see a similar dynamic on Afghanistan where far too many leaders of all parties seem content with having thousands of US troops there in perpetuity fighting a war that few seem to focus on. Yes, decisions about military force – using it and ending its use – are difficult. And yes, there was a much better way to strategically draw down the US troop presence, and even a good case for keeping troops there longer. But since 9/11 we too often shy away from reducing our military presence for fear of the unknown as opposed to leaning towards bringing home the troops as soon as possible.

And so one less ruthless terrorist in the world is good news. But we should stop measuring our counter-terrorism efforts by how many terrorists we kill or our security by how many US troops are deployed.

source: yahoo.com