Golden Dome: who and what should it defend?

Golden Dome Missile Defense System Faces Implementation Hurdles

President Trump initiated the development of the “Golden Dome,” a next-generation missile defense architecture inspired by Israel’s Iron Dome, on January 27, tasking the Pentagon to create a reference framework, capability-based requirements, and an implementation strategy. However, the Pentagon missed the White House’s deadline of March 28 to deliver this crucial report.

Ambitious Requirements for US Missile Shield

The report is expected to include extensive plans to defend the United States against a range of aerial threats, specifically ballistic missiles, hypersonic missiles, advanced cruise missiles, and other next-generation attacks. These threats are anticipated from peer, near-peer, and rogue adversaries. Furthermore, the White House has directed that this initial report serve as the foundation for a subsequent analysis on optimizing theater missile defenses for U.S. installations and allied nations abroad.

Complexity of Modern Missile Defense Compared to SDI

Meeting these comprehensive objectives presents a significant challenge. In comparison, the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) proposed by President Reagan in 1983 had a more limited aim. The success of SDI primarily depended on convincing the Soviet Union of its viability and seriousness. This perception alone contributed to Soviet anxieties and played a role in the eventual collapse of the Soviet Union, even without the U.S. deploying any interceptor missiles.

Golden Dome Requires Tangible Deterrence

The Golden Dome, however, demands a different approach. Unlike SDI, mere posturing will not suffice. The U.S. must demonstrably develop, deploy, and prove the system’s effectiveness as a deterrent. Furthermore, the system must be designed to withstand increasingly sophisticated anti-satellite capabilities from China and Russia. Over time, it may also need to contend with a potential Chinese space-based missile defense counterpart, alongside a growing spectrum of missile threats originating not only from hostile countries but also from non-state actors.

Key Considerations for Space-Based Interceptors

Whether the Pentagon intends to utilize the Golden Dome’s space-based interceptors to counter all these diverse threats remains uncertain. This will largely depend on two critical factors: first, the technological sophistication and capabilities achieved in U.S. space-based interceptors, and second, the precise scope of protection the government aims to provide – defining who and what assets will be defended.

Regional Theater Defense vs. Space-Based System

The president’s directive for a separate Pentagon study focusing on terrestrial-based “theater” missile defenses for specific regions suggests a tiered approach. It implies that the Golden Dome’s space-based interceptor system might not be universally applied. However, this strategy could present complications. For allies and U.S. bases situated close to hostile nations – including Germany, Israel, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, the Philippines, India, Japan, and various NATO members – boost-phase intercept offers the most effective countermeasure against short flight-time missiles. Intercepting missiles immediately after launch is more advantageous than waiting until the terminal phase as they approach their targets. The Golden Dome’s space-based interceptors are inherently better suited for boost phase interception compared to ground-based theater systems.

Alternative Strategies and Dilemmas

Potential solutions to this strategic dilemma exist. One option involves the Pentagon adopting external recommendations to significantly reduce the number of overseas bases. This approach would concentrate U.S. force projection primarily from bases within the continental United States, minimizing reliance on forward deployments. Alternatively, the president could prioritize defending only a select group of allied nations from missile attacks, possibly focusing on key partners such as Israel, Saudi Arabia, or Japan. Either of these strategies could lessen the overall demands placed on the Golden Dome’s global space-based defense network.

Risks of Reduced Protection and Nuclear Proliferation

However, limiting the Golden Dome’s protection scope carries potential risks. It could incentivize unprotected and apprehensive nations to pursue nuclear weapons and nuclear-capable missiles as a hedge against vulnerability, potentially capable of bypassing the Dome. This scenario could heighten the risk of escalatory missile exchanges, similar to tensions between Israel and Iran, with potentially catastrophic consequences, even escalating into broader conflicts, such as a global war.

Benefits of Enhanced Missile Defense Coverage

Conversely, expanding the Golden Dome’s protection umbrella to encompass a wider range of nations could mitigate these dangers. Instead of resorting to nuclear armament, nations with security partnerships with the U.S. would likely seek enhanced security through closer collaboration with Washington. Realizing this benefit, however, would necessitate increased investment in the Golden Dome project.

Diplomatic and Security Implications

Ultimately, both the space-based and terrestrial components of the Golden Dome system will have profound repercussions for future alliances and international security diplomacy. Allied nations will seek formal assurances regarding their protection. Adversaries may propose arms control agreements aimed at limiting the Golden Dome’s capabilities to their strategic advantage. Washington will need to develop its own proactive diplomatic strategies to navigate these complex dynamics.

Strategic and Policy Questions Demand Attention

In conclusion, the Pentagon’s task extends beyond the technical, budgetary, and organizational challenges inherent in the Golden Dome project. It must also grapple with the significant strategic, diplomatic, and policy questions that the system’s deployment will inevitably raise. Addressing these multifaceted issues is paramount before substantial progress towards implementation can be achieved.

Need for Deliberate Planning, Not Hasty Decisions

While the temptation to expedite answers to these complex issues may be strong, rushing to premature conclusions should be avoided. These fundamental questions will remain relevant throughout the Golden Dome’s development and its ongoing mission to defend against hostile missiles and drones.

Pentagon’s Responsibility for Comprehensive Strategy

At a minimum, the Pentagon’s Golden Dome reports must prioritize these critical questions. Furthermore, the reports should clearly articulate how the Department of Defense intends to strike a balance between safeguarding the United States domestically and protecting U.S. interests, allies, and military installations abroad.