Importance Score: 85 / 100 🟢
BEIJING EXPANDS COUNTERSPACE ARSENAL: China is aggressively advancing its counterspace capabilities, developing technologies to challenge space-based assets, according to a new report. The Secure World Foundation’s “Global Counterspace Capabilities” report for 2025 reveals Beijing’s sustained efforts to enhance its military strength in orbit.
China’s Growing Counterspace Technology
The Secure World Foundation’s Global Counterspace Capabilities report 2025, published April 3, delivers an updated and in-depth analysis of various nations’ advancements in counterspace technologies. The report emphasizes technologies and strategies that pose a potential risk to space-based infrastructure.
The report highlights China’s persistent endeavor to cultivate a comprehensive suite of offensive counterspace capabilities. It details activities related to direct-ascent anti-satellite (ASAT) systems, co-orbital ASAT weapons, rendezvous and proximity operations (RPO), directed energy weapons, and electronic warfare (EW).
“Over the past decade, China has conducted numerous tests of technologies and capabilities that are either offensive counterspace weapons or adaptable for such use,” the report asserts.
While analyzing long-term trends, the report also incorporates recent developments from the past year. Notably, it suggests China has positioned an experimental satellite in geostationary orbit (GEO) to test space-based jamming techniques. This is based on People’s Liberation Army publications indicating that current jamming methods are ineffective against specific GEO communications satellites, necessitating research into novel approaches. The report could not specify the exact Chinese satellite(s) involved in these experimental jamming activities.
“China has also commenced establishing the policy, doctrine, and organizational structures to facilitate the integration of counterspace capabilities into its military strategies and operations,” the report concludes.
Anti-Satellite (ASAT) Systems Development
A primary focus of the Secure World Foundation report is the analysis of anti-satellite weapon testing. China is estimated to possess between one and three direct-ascent ASAT (anti-satellite) systems, also known as DA-ASAT.
Their low Earth orbit (LEO) DA-ASAT capabilities are considered advanced and potentially deployed on mobile launch platforms. However, capabilities targeting medium Earth orbit (MEO) or GEO satellites are likely still in experimental or developmental phases.
Rendezvous and Proximity Operations (RPO)
Several Chinese satellites, including Shiyan-24C, TJS-3, TJS-10, and Shijian-17, have engaged in RPO maneuvers in both low Earth orbit (LEO) and GEO. RPO capabilities can be used for intelligence gathering and potentially for counterspace missions. Although these technologies could support co-orbital ASAT capabilities, there is no public evidence confirming their use for destructive purposes.
The report also points out that China’s clandestine reusable spaceplane deployed an object in May 2024 during its recent third flight and subsequently performed proximity maneuvers.
Another notable mission was the launch of the Shijian-25 satellite towards GEO in January, intended for “satellite refueling and life extension technology validation.”
China is also expanding a network of ground-based optical telescopes and radar systems to detect, track, and analyze space objects. This enhances its space situational awareness (SSA) capabilities, complemented by the addition of on-orbit SSA assets.
Electronic Warfare (EW) and Directed Energy Weapon (DEW) Programs
China is believed to have significant electronic warfare (EW) capabilities, particularly for jamming Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) and satellite communications, though granular operational details remain limited. This action, similar to Russia’s efforts, is perceived as a countermeasure against the dominance of commercial satellite constellations, especially SpaceX’s Starlink.
Indications suggest ongoing research and development in directed energy weapons (DEW) for counterspace applications, but concrete information concerning their operational readiness is scarce.
Strategic Reorganization and Ambiguity
The financial investment China dedicates to its counterspace activities remains undisclosed to external observers.
“Limited reliable information has been disclosed regarding the budget for China’s entire space program, much less the specific budget allocated to counterspace technologies,” the report states. “It is probable that in relative terms, China’s space expenditure is less than that of the United States, yet they still manage to finance a substantial and vigorous program.”
The manner in which, and if, these capabilities might be employed is uncertain, contributing to strategic ambiguity surrounding China’s intentions.
“China’s substantial investment in the development and testing of counterspace capabilities suggests a perception of space as a potential arena for future conflicts, irrespective of official declarations,” the report indicates. “However, it remains unclear whether China would fully deploy its offensive counterspace capabilities in a future conflict or if their primary purpose is to serve as a deterrent against perceived US aggression,” the report elaborates.
In a related strategic shift, China dissolved the Strategic Support Force in 2024, replacing it with the Information Support Force—a reorganization that emphasizes information warfare as a critical domain.
Global Counterspace Landscape
The comprehensive report assesses activities of key international actors including the United States, Russia, China, and India—all of whom have conducted debris-generating ASAT tests—along with nations developing counterspace technologies, such as Australia, France, Japan, Iran, Israel, North Korea, South Korea, and the United Kingdom.
The report concludes that while research and development in counterspace capabilities are expanding worldwide, only non-destructive counterspace technologies are currently being utilized in active military conflicts.